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Abstract
We present a text-based framework for inves-
tigating moral sentiment change of the pub-
lic via longitudinal corpora. Our framework
is based on the premise that language use
can inform people’s moral perception toward
right or wrong, and we build our methodol-
ogy by exploring moral biases learned from
diachronic word embeddings. We demon-
strate how a parameter-free model supports
inference of historical shifts in moral sen-
timent toward concepts such as slavery and
democracy over centuries at three incremen-
tal levels: moral relevance, moral polarity,
and fine-grained moral dimensions. We ap-
ply this methodology to visualizing moral time
courses of individual concepts and analyzing
the relations between psycholinguistic vari-
ables and rates of moral sentiment change at
scale. Our work offers opportunities for apply-
ing natural language processing toward char-
acterizing moral sentiment change in society.
1 Moral sentiment change and language
People’s moral sentiment—our feelings toward
right or wrong—can change over time. For in-
stance, the public’s views toward slavery have
shifted substantially over the past centuries (Old-
field, 2012). How society’s moral views evolve
has been a long-standing issue and a constant
source of controversy subject to interpretations
from social scientists, historians, philosophers,
among others. Here we ask whether natural lan-
guage processing has the potential to inform moral
sentiment change in society at scale, involving
minimal human labour or intervention.
The topic of moral sentiment has been thus
far considered a traditional inquiry in philosophy
(Hume, 1739; Smith, 1759; Kant, 1785), with con-
temporary development of this topic represented
∗Equal contribution.
in social psychology (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg,
1969; Stigler et al., 1990; Fiske and Taylor,
1991; Pizarro and Bloom, 2003), cognitive lin-
guistics (Lakoff, 1996), and more recently, the
advent of Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt and
Joseph, 2004; Haidt et al., 2007; Graham et al.,
2013). Despite the fundamental importance and
interdisciplinarity of this topic, large-scale formal
treatment of moral sentiment, particularly its evo-
lution, is still in infancy from the natural lan-
guage processing (NLP) community (see overview
in Section 2).
We believe that there is a tremendous poten-
tial to bring NLP methodologies to bear on the
problem of moral sentiment change. We build
on extensive recent work showing that word em-
beddings reveal implicit human biases (Boluk-
basi et al., 2016; Caliskan et al., 2017) and so-
cial stereotypes (Garg et al., 2018). Differing from
this existing work, we demonstrate that moral sen-
timent change can be revealed by moral biases
implicitly learned from diachronic text corpora.
Accordingly, we present to our knowledge the
first text-based framework for probing moral sen-
timent change at a large scale with support for
different levels of analysis concerning moral rel-
evance, moral polarity, and fine-grained moral di-
mensions. As such, for any query item such as
slavery, our goal is to automatically infer its moral
trajectories from sentiments at each of these levels
over a long period of time.
Our approach is based on the premise that peo-
ple’s moral sentiments are reflected in natural
language, and more specifically, in text (Bloom,
2010). In particular, we know that books are
highly effective tools for conveying moral views
to the public. For example, Uncle Tom’s Cabin
(Stowe, 1852) was central to the anti-slavery
movement in the United States. The framework
that we develop builds on this premise to explore
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Figure 1: Illustration of moral sentiment change over the past two centuries. Moral sentiment trajectories of three
probe concepts, slavery, democracy, and gay, are shown in moral sentiment embedding space through 2D projec-
tion from Fisher’s discriminant analysis with respect to seed words from the classes of moral virtue, moral vice,
and moral irrelevance. Parenthesized items represent moral categories predicted to be most strongly associated
with the probe concepts. Gray markers represent the fine-grained centroids (or anchors) of these moral classes.
changes in moral sentiment reflected in longitudi-
nal or historical text.
Figure 1 offers a preview of our framework by
visualizing the evolution trajectories of the pub-
lic’s moral sentiment toward concepts signified
by the probe words slavery, democracy, and gay.
Each of these concepts illustrates a piece of “moral
history” tracked through a period of 200 years
(1800 to 2000), and our framework is able to cap-
ture nuanced moral changes. For instance, slav-
ery initially lies at the border of moral virtue (pos-
itive sentiment) and vice (negative sentiment) in
the 1800s yet gradually moves toward the center
of moral vice over the 200-year period; in contrast,
democracy considered morally negative (e.g., sub-
version and anti-authority under monarchy) in the
1800s is now perceived as morally positive, as a
mechanism for fairness; gay, which came to de-
note homosexuality only in the 1930s (Kay et al.,
2019), is inferred to be morally irrelevant until the
modern day. We will describe systematic evalua-
tions and applications of our framework that ex-
tend beyond these anecdotal cases of moral senti-
ment change.
The general text-based framework that we pro-
pose consists of a parameter-free approach that fa-
cilitates the prediction of public moral sentiment
toward individual concepts, automated retrieval of
morally changing concepts, and broad-scale psy-
cholinguistic analyses of historical rates of moral
sentiment change. We provide a description of the
probabilistic models and data used, followed by
comprehensive evaluations of our methodology.
2 Emerging NLP research on morality
An emerging body of work in natural language
processing and computational social science has
investigated how NLP systems can detect moral
sentiment in online text. For example, moral
rhetoric in social media and political discourse
(Garten et al., 2016; Johnson and Goldwasser,
2018; Lin et al., 2018), the relation between moral-
ization in social media and violent protests (Mooi-
jman et al., 2018), and bias toward refugees in
talk radio shows (Gillani and Levy, 2019) have
been some of the topics explored in this line of
inquiry. In contrast to this line of research, the de-
velopment of a formal framework for moral senti-
ment change is still under-explored, with no exist-
ing systematic and formal treatment of this topic
(Bloom, 2010).
While there is emerging awareness of ethical
issues in NLP (Hovy et al., 2017; Alfano et al.,
2018), work exploiting NLP techniques to study
principles of moral sentiment change is scarce.
Moreover, since morality is variable across cul-
tures and time (Graham et al., 2013; Bloom,
2010), developing systems that capture the di-
achronic nature of moral sentiment will be a piv-
otal research direction. Our work leverages and
complements existing research that finds implicit
human biases from word embeddings (Bolukbasi
et al., 2016; Caliskan et al., 2017; Garten et al.,
2016) by developing a novel perspective on using
NLP methodology to discover principles of moral
sentiment change in human society.
Figure 2: Illustration of the three-tier framework that
supports moral sentiment inference at different levels.
3 A three-tier modelling framework
Our framework treats the moral sentiment toward
a concept at three incremental levels, as illus-
trated in Figure 2. First, we consider moral rel-
evance, distinguishing between morally irrelevant
and morally relevant concepts. At the second tier,
moral polarity, we further split morally relevant
concepts into those that are positively or nega-
tively perceived in the moral domain. Finally, a
third tier classifies these concepts into fine-grained
categories of human morality.
We draw from research in social psychology to
inform our methodology, most prominently Moral
Foundations Theory (MFT; Graham et al., 2013).
MFT seeks to explain the structure and variation
of human morality across cultures, and proposes
five moral foundations: Care / Harm, Fairness /
Cheating, Loyalty / Betrayal, Authority / Subver-
sion, and Sanctity / Degradation. Each foundation
is summarized by a positive and a negative pole,
resulting in ten fine-grained moral categories.
3.1 Lexical data for moral sentiment
To ground moral sentiment in text, we leverage
the Moral Foundations Dictionary (MFD; Graham
et al., 2009). The MFD is a psycholinguistic re-
source that associates each MFT category with a
set of seed words, which are words that provide
evidence for the corresponding moral category in
text. We use the MFD for moral polarity classi-
fication by dividing seed words into positive and
negative sets, and for fine-grained categorization
by splitting them into the 10 MFT categories.
To implement the first tier of our framework
and detect moral relevance, we complement our
morally relevant seed words with a correspond-
ing set of seed words approximating moral irrel-
evance based on the notion of valence, i.e., the de-
gree of pleasantness or unpleasantness of a stimu-
lus. We refer to the emotional valence ratings col-
lected by Warriner et al. (2013) for approximately
14,000 English words, and choose the words with
most neutral valence rating that do not occur in the
MFD as our set of morally irrelevant seed words,
for an equal total number of morally relevant and
morally irrelevant words.
3.2 Models
We propose and evaluate a set of probabilistic
models to classify concepts in the three tiers of
morality specified above. Our models exploit the
semantic structure of word embeddings (Mikolov
et al., 2013) to perform tiered moral classification
of query concepts. In each tier, the model receives
a query word embedding vector q and a set of seed
words for each class in that tier, and infers the
posterior probabilities over the set of classes c to
which the query concept is associated with.
The seed words function as “labelled examples”
that guide the moral classification of novel con-
cepts, and are organized per classification tier as
follows. In moral relevance classification, sets S0
and S1 contain the morally irrelevant and morally
relevant seed words, respectively; for moral polar-
ity, S+ and S− contain the positive and negative
seed words; and for fine-grained moral categories,
S1, . . . ,S10 contain the seed words for the 10 cat-
egories of MFT. Then our general problem is to
estimate p(c |q), where q is a query vector and c
is a moral category in the desired tier.
We evaluate the following four models:
• A Centroid model summarizes each set of
seed words by its expected vector in embed-
ding space, and classifies concepts into the
class of closest expected embedding in Eu-
clidean distance following a softmax rule;
• A Naı¨ve Bayes model considers both mean
and variance, under the assumption of inde-
pendence among embedding dimensions, by
fitting a normal distribution with mean vector
and diagonal covariance matrix to the set of
seed words of each class;
• A k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) model exploits
local density estimation and classifies con-
cepts according to the majority vote of the k
seed words closest to the query vector;
• A Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) model
performs density estimation at a broader
scale by considering the contribution of each
seed word toward the total likelihood of each
Model Parameter Posterior Inference
Centroid – p(c |q) ∝ exp(−‖q−E [Sc]‖)
Naı¨ve Bayes – p(c |q) ∝ ∏dj=1 fN
(
q j;µ = E [Sc, j] ,σ2 = Var [Sc, j]
)
k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) k p(c |q) ∝ ∣∣{k nearest seed words to q}∩Sc∣∣
Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) h p(c |q) ∝ 1|Sc| ∑w∈Sc fMN (q;µ = w,Σ= diag(h))
Table 1: Summary of models for moral sentiment classification. Each model infers moral sentiment of a query
word vector q based on moral classes c (at any of the three levels) represented by moral seed words Sc. E [Sc] is the
mean vector of Sc; E [Sc, j] ,Var [Sc, j] refer to the mean and variance of Sc along the j-th dimension in embedding
space. d is the number of embedding dimensions; and fN , fMN refer to the density functions of univariate and
multivariate normal distributions, respectively.
class, regulated by a bandwidth parameter h
that controls the sensitivity of the model to
distance in embedding space.
Table 1 specifies the formulation of each model.
Note that we adopt a parsimonious design prin-
ciple in our modelling: both Centroid and Naı¨ve
Bayes are parameter-free models, kNN only de-
pends on the choice of k, and KDE uses a single
bandwidth parameter h.
4 Historical corpus data
To apply our models diachronically, we require
a word embedding space that captures the mean-
ings of words at different points in time and re-
flects changes pertaining to a particular word as
diachronic shifts in a common embedding space.
Following Hamilton et al. (2016), we com-
bine skip-gram word embeddings (Mikolov et al.,
2013) trained on longitudinal corpora of English
with rotational alignments of embedding spaces
to obtain diachronic word embeddings that are
aligned through time.
We divide historical time into decade-long bins,
and use two sets of embeddings provided by
Hamilton et al. (2016), each trained on a different
historical corpus of English:
• Google N-grams (Lin et al., 2012): a cor-
pus of 8.5× 1011 tokens collected from the
English literature (Google Books, all-genres)
spanning the period 1800–1999.
• COHA (Davies, 2010): a smaller corpus of
4.1× 108 tokens from works selected so as
to be genre-balanced and representative of
American English in the period 1810–2009.
5 Model evaluations
We evaluated our models in two ways: classifica-
tion of moral seed words on all three tiers (moral
relevance, polarity, and fine-grained categories),
and correlation of model predictions with human
judgments.
5.1 Moral sentiment inference of seed words
In this evaluation, we assessed the ability of our
models to classify the seed words that compose
our moral environment in a leave-one-out classi-
fication task. We performed the evaluation for
all three classification tiers: 1) moral relevance,
where seed words are split into morally relevant
and morally irrelevant; 2) moral polarity, where
moral seed words are split into positive and nega-
tive; 3) fine-grained categories, where moral seed
words are split into the 10 MFT categories. In each
test, we removed one seed word from the training
set at a time to obtain cross-validated model pre-
dictions.
Table 2 shows classification accuracy for all
models and corpora on each tier for the 1990–1999
period.1 We observe that all models perform sub-
stantially better than chance, confirming the effi-
cacy of our methodology in capturing moral di-
mensions of words. We also observe that mod-
els using word embeddings trained on Google N-
grams perform better than those trained on COHA,
which could be expected given the larger corpus
size of the former.
In the remaining analyses, we employ the Cen-
troid model, which offers competitive accuracy
and a simple, parameter-free specification.
5.2 Alignment with human valence ratings
We evaluated the approximate agreement between
our methodology and human judgments using va-
lence ratings, i.e., the degree of pleasantness or un-
1We also computed average accuracy over all decades us-
ing Google N-grams, the only corpus covering all moral cat-
egories through time. See Supplementary Material.
Google N-grams COHA
Model Relevance Polarity Category Relevance Polarity Category
Random 0.50 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.50 0.10
Centroid 0.84 0.90 0.59 0.78 0.80 0.40
Naı¨ve Bayes 0.84 0.89 0.53 0.76 0.78 0.39
1-NN 0.80 0.88 0.53 0.74 0.76 0.32
5-NN 0.83 0.93 0.57 0.74 0.75 0.33
KDE 0.82 0.90 0.57 0.80 0.76 0.33
Table 2: Classification accuracy of moral seed words for moral relevance, moral polarity, and fine-grained moral
categories based on 1990–1999 word embeddings for two independent corpora, Google N-grams and COHA.
Corpus Correlation
Google N-grams 0.43 (n = 12293; p < 0.0001)
COHA 0.38 (n = 7141; p < 0.0001)
Table 3: Pearson correlations between model predicted
moral sentiment polarities and human valence ratings.
pleasantness of a stimulus. Our assumption is that
the valence of a concept should correlate with its
perceived moral polarity, e.g., morally repulsive
ideas should evoke an unpleasant feeling. How-
ever, we do not expect this correspondence to be
perfect; for example, the concept of dessert evokes
a pleasant reaction without being morally relevant.
In this analysis, we took the valence ratings for
the nearly 14,000 English nouns collected by War-
riner et al. (2013) and, for each query word q,
we generated a corresponding prediction of pos-
itive moral polarity from our model, P(c+ |q). Ta-
ble 3 shows the correlations between human va-
lence ratings and predictions of positive moral po-
larity generated by models trained on each of our
corpora. We observe that the correlations are sig-
nificant, suggesting the ability of our methodol-
ogy to capture relevant features of moral sentiment
from text.
In the remaining applications, we use the di-
achronic embeddings trained on the Google N-
grams corpus, which enabled superior model per-
formance throughout our evaluations.
6 Applications to diachronic morality
We applied our framework in three ways: 1)
evaluation of selected concepts in historical time
courses and prediction of human judgments; 2)
automatic detection of moral sentiment change;
and 3) broad-scale study of the relations between
psycholinguistic variables and historical change of
moral sentiment toward concepts.
6.1 Moral change in individual concepts
Historical time courses. We applied our mod-
els diachronically to predict time courses of moral
relevance, moral polarity, and fine-grained moral
categories toward two historically relevant topics:
slavery and democracy. By grounding our model
in word embeddings for each decade and query-
ing concepts at the three tiers of classification, we
obtained the time courses shown in Figure 3.
We note that these trajectories illustrate actual
historical trends. Predictions for democracy show
a trend toward morally positive sentiment, con-
sistent with the adoption of democratic regimes
in Western societies. On the other hand, predic-
tions for slavery trend down and suggest a drop
around the 1860s, coinciding with the American
Civil War. We also observe changes in the domi-
nant fine-grained moral categories, such as the per-
ception of democracy as a fair concept, suggesting
potential mechanisms behind the polarity changes
and providing further insight into the public senti-
ment toward these concepts as evidenced by text.
Prediction of human judgments. We explored
the predictive potential of our framework by com-
paring model predictions with human judgments
of moral relevance and acceptability. We used
data from the Pew Research Center’s 2013 Global
Attitudes survey (Pew Research Center, 2013), in
which participants from 40 countries judged 8 top-
ics such as abortion and homosexuality as one of
“acceptable”, “unacceptable”, and “not a moral is-
sue”.
We compared human ratings with model predic-
tions at two tiers: for moral relevance, we paired
the proportion of “not a moral issue” human re-
sponses with irrelevance predictions p(c0 |q) for
Concept Rate (e−03/decade) Relevant Moral Category Switching Period
abortion 4.24** cheating− 1890
propriety 4.06*** fairness+ 1870
commandment 3.68*** sanctity+ 1880
righteousness 3.56*** sanctity+ 1800
authorities 3.42*** authority+ 1890
apostle 3.41*** authority+ 1900
intervention 3.33** authority+ 1860
jew 3.32*** degradation− 1870
foreigner 3.30*** authority+ 1800
individuality 3.26*** authority+ 1860
Table 4: Top 10 changing words towards moral relevance during 1800–2000, with model-inferred moral category
and switching period. *, **, and *** denote p < 0.05, p < 0.001, and p < 0.0001, all Bonferroni-corrected.
Concept Rate (e−03/decade) Early Category Modern Category Switching Period
wage 4.38** subversion− fairness+ 1810
commitment 3.78 harm− authority+ 1830
innovation 3.21 authority+ authority+ 1800
help 3.20** sanctity+ care+ 1880
mandate 3.17* authority+ authority+ 1800
guidance 3.04*** authority+ authority+ 1800
licence 3.01* authority+ authority+ 1800
abortion 2.95 degradation− cheating− 1890
democracy 2.93** authority+ fairness+ 1800
disclosure 2.89*** fairness+ fairness+ 1840
propaganda −7.75 * authority+ subversion− 1910
humiliation −4.05 *** authority+ harm− 1800
seriousness −4.02 ** authority+ harm− 1800
legacy −3.76 *** authority+ subversion− 1800
behavior −3.73 ** harm− authority+ 1830
cheerfulness −3.66 *** authority+ sanctity+ 1800
candour −3.37 * authority+ degradation− 1800
offense −3.37 fairness+ subversion− 1840
indulgence −3.37 *** authority+ degradation− 1800
exertion −3.26 *** authority+ degradation− 1800
Table 5: Top 10 changing words towards moral positive (upper panel) and negative (lower panel) polarities, with
model-inferred most representative moral categories during historical and modern periods and the switching peri-
ods. *, **, and *** denote p < 0.05, p < 0.001, and p < 0.0001, all Bonferroni-corrected for multiple tests.
each topic, and for moral acceptability, we paired
the proportion of “acceptable” responses with pos-
itive predictions p(c+ |q). We used 1990s word
embeddings, and obtained predictions for two-
word topics by querying the model with their av-
eraged embeddings.
Figure 4 shows plots of relevance and polar-
ity predictions against survey proportions, and we
observe a visible correspondence between model
predictions and human judgments despite the dif-
ficulty of this task and limited number of topics.
6.2 Retrieval of morally changing concepts
Beyond analyzing selected concepts, we applied
our framework predictively on a large repertoire
of words to automatically discover the concepts
that have exhibited the greatest change in moral
sentiment at two tiers, moral relevance and moral
polarity.
We selected the 10,000 nouns with highest to-
tal frequency in the 1800–1999 period according
to data from Hamilton et al. (2016), restricted
to words labelled as nouns in WordNet (Miller,
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Figure 3: Moral sentiment time courses of slavery (left) and democracy (right) at each of the three levels, inferred
by the Centroid model. Time courses at the moral relevance and polarity levels are in log odds ratios, and those for
the fine-grained moral categories are represented by circles with sizes proportional to category probabilities.
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Figure 4: Model predictions against percentage of Pew respondents who selected “Not a moral concern” (left) or
“Acceptable” (right), with lines of best fit and Pearson correlation coefficients ρ shown in the background.
1995) for validation. For each such word q, we
computed diachronic moral relevance scores Ri =
p(c1 |q), i = 1, . . . ,20 for the 20 decades in our
time span. Then, we performed a linear regression
of R on T = 1, . . . ,n and took the fitted slope as a
measure of moral relevance change. We repeated
the same procedure for moral polarity. Finally, we
removed words with average relevance score be-
low 0.5 to focus on morally relevant retrievals.
Table 4 shows the words with steepest predicted
change toward moral relevance, along with their
predicted fine-grained moral categories in mod-
ern times (i.e., 1900–1999). Table 5 shows the
words with steepest predicted change toward the
positive and negative moral poles. To further in-
vestigate the moral sentiment that may have led
to such polarity shifts, we also show the predicted
fine-grained moral categories of each word at its
earliest time of predicted moral relevance and in
modern times. Although we do not have access
to ground truth for this application, these results
offer initial insight into the historical moral land-
scape of the English language at scale.
6.3 Broad-scale investigation of moral change
In this application, we investigated the hypothe-
sis that concept concreteness is inversely related
to change in moral relevance, i.e., that concepts
considered more abstract might become morally
relevant at a higher rate than concepts considered
more concrete. To test this hypothesis, we per-
formed a multiple linear regression analysis on
rate of change toward moral relevance of a large
repertoire of words against concept concreteness
ratings, word frequency (a correlate of seman-
tic change; see Hamilton et al., 2016), and word
length (as a proxy for concept complexity; see
Lewis and Frank, 2016).
We obtained norms of concreteness ratings from
Warriner et al. (2013). We collected the same set
of high-frequency nouns as in the previous anal-
ysis, along with their fitted slopes of moral rele-
vance change. Since we were interested in moral
relevance change within this large set of words, we
restricted our analysis to those words whose model
predictions indicate change in moral relevance, in
either direction, from the 1800s to the 1990s.
We performed a multiple linear regression un-
der the following model:
ρ˜(w) = β f log( f (w))+βll(w)+βcc(w)+β0+ ε˜
(1)
Here ρ(w) is the slope of moral relevance change
for word w; f (w) is its average frequency; l(w) is
its character length; c(w) is its concreteness rat-
ing; β f , βl , βc, and β0 are the corresponding fac-
tor weights and intercept, respectively; and ε ∼
N (0,σ) is the regression error term.
Table 6 shows the results of multiple linear re-
gression. We observe that concreteness is a signif-
icant negative predictor of change toward moral
relevance, suggesting that abstract concepts are
more strongly associated with increasing moral
relevance over time than concrete concepts. This
Factor Coeff. (e-03) Significance
Frequency 0.1 p < 0.001
Length −0.03 n.s. (α = 0.05)
Concreteness −0.2 p < 0.002
Table 6: Results from multiple regression that regresses
rate of change in moral relevance against the factors of
word frequency, length, and concreteness (n = 606).
significance persists under partial correlation test
against the control factors (p < 0.01).
We further verified the diachronic component of
this effect in a random permutation analysis. We
generated 1,000 control time courses by randomly
shuffling the 20 decades in our data, and repeated
the regression analysis to obtain a control distri-
bution for each regression coefficient. All effects
became non-significant under the shuffled condi-
tion, suggesting the relevance of concept concrete-
ness for diachronic change in moral sentiment (see
Supplementary Material).
7 Discussion and conclusion
We presented a text-based framework for explor-
ing the socio-scientific problem of moral sen-
timent change. Our methodology uses mini-
mal parameters and exploits implicit moral biases
learned from diachronic word embeddings to re-
veal the public’s moral perception toward a large
concept repertoire over a long historical period.
Differing from existing work in NLP that treats
moral sentiment as a flat classification problem
(Garten et al., 2016; Johnson and Goldwasser,
2018), our framework probes moral sentiment
change at multiple levels and captures moral dy-
namics concerning relevance, polarity, and fine-
grained categories informed by Moral Founda-
tions Theory (Graham et al., 2013). We applied
our methodology to the automated analyses of
moral change both in individual concepts and at
a broad scale, thus providing insights into psy-
cholinguistic variables that associate with rates of
moral change in the public.
Our current work focuses on exploring moral
sentiment change in English-speaking cultures.
Future research should evaluate the appropriate-
ness of the framework to probing moral change
from a diverse range of cultures and linguistic
backgrounds, and the extent to which moral sen-
timent change interacts and crisscrosses with lin-
guistic meaning change and lexical coinage. Our
work creates opportunities for applying natural
language processing toward characterizing moral
sentiment change in society.
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A Model evaluation on historical corpora
Table S1 shows average seed word classification
accuracy for all models on each moral classifi-
cation tier for the entire 1800-1999 period. We
performed this historical evaluation using Google
N-grams embeddings only, since COHA did not
contain seed word embeddings for all moral cate-
gories in the earliest decades. Similar to the evalu-
ation in modern times, we observe consistent per-
formance above chance in all models.
Model Relevance Polarity Category
Random 0.50 0.50 0.10
Centroid 0.82(1) 0.89(2) 0.64(2)
N. Bayes 0.83(2) 0.90(1) 0.59(2)
1-NN 0.80(1) 0.89(2) 0.57(3)
5-NN 0.83(1) 0.91(1) 0.62(3)
KDE 0.83(1) 0.91(1) 0.64(2)
Table S1: Moral seed word classification accuracy for
moral relevance, moral polarity, and fine-grained moral
categories across models using Google N-grams em-
beddings. Mean accuracies and standard deviations
across all decades in 1800–1999.
B Time-shuffled regression analysis
Figure S1 shows the diachronic coefficients for
word frequency, length, and concreteness on
moral relevance change from multiple regression
analaysis, compared to the distribution of coeffi-
cients obtained from a control condition of 1,000
shuffled time courses. We observe that all ef-
fects become non-significant under the shuffled
condition, and a strong diachronic effect of con-
creteness compared to the control suggests the
relevance of this psycholinguistic variable for di-
achronic change in moral sentiment.
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Figure S1: Multiple regression coefficients of moral
relevance change versus control condition. Points show
diachronic coefficients, and error bars show 1 standard
deviation around the mean control coefficients.
C Additional time courses
Figure S2 illustrates the moral trajectories for gay.
Although gay originally referred to that which is
“skittish/spirited” in the 1800s, it later acquired
the meaning of “pertaining to homosexuality” in
the 1930s (?). This shift in semantics to a subject
of more controversy is reflected in the moral rele-
vance plot.
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Figure S2: Moral sentiment time courses of gay at each
of the three levels, inferred by the Centroid model.
Time courses at the moral relevance and polarity lev-
els are in log odds ratio, and those for the fine-grained
moral categories are represented by circles with sizes
proportional to category probabilities.
